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Michael A.R. Biggs 
Graphical Problems in Wittgenstein's Nachlaß 
 
 
Note to the online version 
 
There are 22 graphics in this paper. In 1995 they were published as endnotes. In 
this version they are inserted in the running text as originally intended. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper describes some features of Wittgenstein's Nachlaß which lie on the 
boundary between text and graphics. These deliberately ambiguous features are 
introduced as part of Wittgenstein's method of using "text-experiments" 
comparable to "thought-experiments". These features present problems of 
interpretation, and therefore of representation, in print or as encoded text for 
computer-aided analysis because their ambiguity must be maintained. The 
avoidance of the problem by the use of names is rejected with reference to 
Wittgenstein's discussion of universals in BLB. The resultant system of encoding 
graphics for computer-aided analysis at the Wittgenstein Archives is briefly 
described. Finally, in any representation of the Nachlaß, the need to maintain the 
integration of graphics and text is emphasised. 
 
 
Graphical Problems in Wittgenstein's Nachlaß 
 
The primary objective of the transcriptions being undertaken at the Wittgenstein 
Archives at the University of Bergen is to present material which is capable of 
textual analysis by computer. However, Wittgenstein's philosophical works are 
well known for containing graphics. In my catalogue of the graphics in the 
published works (Biggs and Pichler 1993) I identified 479 instances, and work in 
progress compiling a database of graphics in the manuscripts in the Nachlaß 
(MSS 101-182 as defined in von Wright 1982) contains approximately 2500 
instances. 
 
In some cases these graphics may be included or excluded without affecting the 
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ability to analyse the text. But there are some graphics which act as word-
substitutes. Therefore even if exclusively textual analysis is desired, some 
encoding is necessary in such places to indicate the presence of a graphic. In 
addition to the unequivocal use of graphics, there are many instances of features 
which lie at the very margin of the distinction between graphics and text. These 
features are a symptom of Wittgenstein's philosophical method and this paper 
focuses on them and considers the implications for the mark-up of the body text. 
 
[752] 
The general impression one gains from the Nachlaß is that the scripts are working 
documents, full of corrections, amendments and compositional instructions. Some 
of these annotations made by Wittgenstein on his own writings are graphical in 
character. For example, there are many occurrences of arrows indicating the 
repositioning of text on a single page. He also uses a series of marks and ciphers 
to stand for editorial instructions such as moving sections to locations in other 
scripts, indentation of new sections, etc. All this commentary, both graphical and 
textual, on the base text may be referred to as the meta-text. The meta-text 
contains interesting information on Wittgenstein's compositional process, but 
consists of signs which are not to be reproduced in the reorganised or edited text 
itself. We can thus distinguish between the diplomatic version of the text, and the 
normalised version; the former reproducing the meta-text either typographically 
or in facsimile, and the latter in which the instructions contained in the meta-text 
are implemented. 
 
The term "graphic" is itself somewhat vague, and may be used to describe a wide 
variety of phenomena. Wittgenstein's method, particularly in the later writings, is 
to question our philosophical assumptions about the way that language is 
operating, and one means by which this is achieved is to present text-experiments, 
rather like thought-experiments. In these experiments a new sign is introduced. It 
is often a simple pictorial graphic with more than one reading: 
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It is possible, if undesirable, to omit this pictorial graphic in a normalised version 
of the text because it serves as an illustration. In other words, the text makes 
sense with or without it but the illustration demonstrates or reinforces what is said 
in the text. Graphics which are syntactically integrated in the text cannot be 
omitted, though there are examples where its exact orthography is not important, 
e.g.: 
In an earlier folio of the same manuscript, in addition to noting the presence of an 
arrow, representing its orientation is also necessary to preserve the sense, e.g.: 
Here, the arrow is a conventionalised pointing sign. In a typographic 
representation of the manuscript, the exact orientation and appearance may be 
substituted by a "type" which is capable of indicating the sense of opposition in the 
second example, e.g: "this: ? , and not this: ? ". Felicitous transcription in this 
case could be regarded as maintaining sense without necessarily maintaining 
appearance. 
 
[753] 
Substituting the name of a graphic for its graphical representation may be possible 
in some instances, though normally the inability to differentiate types from tokens 
results in an inability to name a graphical form. General names do not give 
information other than marking the presence of a graphic, and when substituted 
may not integrate satisfactorily with the body text, e.g. compare: 
 
 Wenn wir jemandem ein gewisses Zeichen etwa zeigen, so fällt 
ihm eine Ziffer ein... (RFM 1974 VI §44) 
 
and; 
 
 
MS 134 f.59 
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 When we show someone a certain sign e.g. , a numeral 
occurs to him... (RFM 1978 VI §44) 
 
as normalised versions of; 
The use of general names is misleading if subsequent textual analysis interprets all 
graphical representations as general representations. 
 
 there is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression, to 
think that the man who has learnt to understand a general term, 
say, the term "leaf", has thereby come to possess a kind of 
general picture of a leaf... one which only contains what is 
common to all leaves. (BLB p.17f.) 
 
The use of general pictorial graphics or genre-pictures is an established practice 
of non-denotative visual representation (Goodman 1976 §1.5). However, here 
Wittgenstein contrasts it with our temptation to assume the necessity of denotation 
by linguistic universals, e.g. Goethe's Urpflanze. 
 
Even if names are sought for each graphic, Wittgenstein introduces specific text-
experiments based on ambiguity of reading and naming. Such a graphic is the 
ambiguous character  in MS 132 p.183 (RPP-I §539, etc.). Its function is 
similar to the binary switching of the duck-rabbit illustration. As an ambiguous 
pictorial graphic, the duck-rabbit is compared with understanding the meaning of 
a word (PI p.214). Such examples illustrate the role of a sign within a community 
 
MS 164 p.133 
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of users by presenting our community with a kind of double-entendre. The use of 
a visual metaphor with two clearly opposed interpretations, coupled with the 
thought-experiment of "aspect-blindness", questions our assumptions about the 
connection between signs and their use. 
 
Character ambiguity is also found in the representation , which has a 
typographical form identical to both a mirrored Latin character R and the Cyrillic 
upper case character Ya. However, the mirrored R and Ya must be differentiated 
[754] 
for analytical purposes. Differentiation in this case is achieved not by detailed 
graphical analysis but by the textual context, e.g. Russian text in MS 166 pp.57-
65. 
 
Wittgenstein uses whole words in "mirrored writing" in PI and LW (p.198 and 
§599 respectively), to comment on our changed perception of script when 
reversed. The corresponding manuscript passage for PI (MS 144 p.46) does not 
include a sample, only a meta-textual instruction to include mirrored writing. In the 
manuscript for LW (MS 137 p.135a) there is inverted writing with a meta-textual 
instruction to represent it as mirrored writing. In these cases it is difficult to know 
what should be represented in an edited or normalised representation since the 
text of PI is preceded by the experiment to "hold the drawing of a face upside 
down...". Four figures then follow in the comparative pairings: (a) is to (b) as (c) is 
to (d). However, in the published edition of PI, (a) is a 180? rotation of (b) while 
(c) is a horizontal reflection of (d). This provides an example of the inappropriate 
graphical representation of the pair (a),(b) or (c),(d). 
 
    
 
 
 
Ambiguous characters may also be used as non-
conventional signs. For example, Wittgenstein rotates a Latin character A (MS 
152 p.29) through 90? increments. It appears at one point to be similar to the 
logical notation ". However, this sign may alternatively be the inverted Latin 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
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character A, or a sign used habitually in the meta-text to indicate text to be moved 
to another location in the script, e.g.: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether a form is a graphical sign or other character representation is not always 
clear. It may also be desirable to substitute standard characters, e.g. ", for 
graphical representations to facilitate on-screen or printed representation. 
However, for computer-aided analysis an encoded character representation must 
indicate the difference between logical "for all" and "inverted or rotated Latin A" 
or any other sign, even if the printer instruction is identical. This may be achieved 
by a combination of graphical and character disambiguation codes. 
 
Character disambiguation is also necessary to distinguish between a mirrored 
upper case Latin E (e.g.  in MS 132 p.30) and the logical notation $; a 
rotated upper case Latin M (e.g.  in MS 132 p.40) and the upper case 
Greek S. Additionally some novel composites are proposed, for example the 
combination of the upper case Latin I and the numeral 3 to create an upper case 
Latin B (e.g.   in MS 132 p.97). Each encoding 
might differentiate between a graphic and a standard character, or cue the 
graphical interpretation of a particular orthographic token. 
 
[755] 
Thus far, the distinction between graphics and text has been made on the basis of 
whether a feature belongs to a conventional sign set. The ambiguous character 
formed a marginal case and extremes were represented by the Latin alphabet as 
non-ambiguous orthographic types, and overtly pictorial graphics such as the 
duck-rabbit. However, the sign set of the Latin alphabet must also be arranged in 
a left-to-right linear distribution. Where the distribution of the signs on the page 
departs from this convention it may again be appropriate to assign a "graphics" 
code. For example, a table, whether ruled or unruled, may be regarded as a 
graphic. 
 
MS 130 
p.55 
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The left-right reading convention itself forms part of a text-experiment. For 
example, our practice of writing p to the fifth place as 3.14159 is contrasted with 
an alternative spatial technique in Z §699 (MS 131 p.144, also published in RPP-
I §330): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This "alter[s] its appearance to the point of unrecognizability by us". The example 
makes the comparison with a practice which we do recognize, that of translating a 
lyric poem into another language, or solving the problem 
 
 How is this joke (e.g.) to be translated (i.e. replaced) by a joke in 
the other language? (Z §698) 
 
Felicity is here presented as the appropriate replacement of one joke by another, 
which is equivalent to the replacement of a textual practice with a graphical one. 
 
We have a graphical calculus to demonstrate the comprehensiveness of lists. This 
graphical practice may be clearly seen in the standard layout of the first two 
columns of a truth-table: 
 
Z §699 
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T T  
T F  
F T  
F F  
 
The technique of systematically varying the permutation of the elements enables 
the author to demonstrate comprehensiveness. It is also seen in other tabular 
arrangements, e.g. PG p.348: 
 
A  B  C 
A  C  B 
B  A  C 
B  C  A 
C  A  B 
C  B  A 
 
The graphical layout shows that no line is repeated and proves that there are 
therefore six permutations of the set of letters, i.e. that there is "a single pattern" 
[756] 
(RFM-I §28). However, alternative graphical practices may prove, for example, 
that 2+2+2=4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, Wittgenstein draws our attention to the implicit graphical proof in many of 
 
RFM-I §38 
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our mathematical concepts including counting. (§§28-36). 
 
In addition to the problems of interpreting and therefore of representing graphics 
on-screen or on paper, there is the problem of providing users with a compatible 
system of search and retrieval. Although some file formats can contain text based 
information in the file, e.g. TIFF (Tagged Image File Format), most graphical 
images are unanalysable by methods which are comparable to the analysis of the 
text string. The Wittgenstein Archives use codes specific to the representation of 
graphics which allows them to be located within the text string. As indicated 
above this sometimes labels a graphical layout of otherwise normal typographical 
characters, e.g. tables. To differentiate basic graphical forms an embedded 
keyword system has been devised which groups graphics according to their 
appearance. This grouping allows indexing and retrieval of graphics independently 
from viewing and analysing the images themselves. 
 
The keyword system currently divides the full range of graphics into 17 primary 
classifications, e.g. Schema, which comprises all forms of tabular layout. 
Secondary keywords differentiate between variants on this form, e.g. ruled 
Schema such as truth tables, etc. A tertiary keyword is available to differentiate 
the number of similar elements in the whole graphic, e.g. two such Schema. By 
using up to three keywords, graphics of a similar physical appearance may be 
easily searched and retrieved. This indexing currently identifies 106 basic 
appearance types. 
 
Graphics having identical primary, secondary and tertiary keywords will not 
necessarily be tokens of the same type, e.g. a truth table and a set of dots in the 
same pattern. However, it will normally enable comparisons to be made between 
structurally similar graphics and their textual context. Combined use of graphical 
and non-graphical codes in searches is also possible. For example, ambiguous 
characters such as 12 and 13 have the same graphics keywords but the 
latter also has a Russian character code when it could be read as the Cyrillic Ya. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is possible to omit some, but not all, of the 2500 graphics in a normalised 
representation of MSS 101-182. For computer-aided analysis codes need to be 
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[757] 
inserted to show the presence of a graphic and information about the general 
nature of the graphic. Conventional signs may be named, e.g. arrows, but may 
also need secondary codes to indicate orientation in order to preserve the sense 
of the textual context. 
 
Although the majority of graphics are clearly pictorial, there are also examples 
which lie close to, or cross, any boundary which might be drawn in an attempt to 
divide the two. Graphics may also encompass the non-conventional page layout 
of standard text. Encoding must not proscribe a particular interpretation as 
conventional or unconventional notation as such signs are often introduced for 
their ambiguity. For the purposes of analysis it is desirable to be able to identify all 
graphics whether pictorial in character or not. It is also desirable to represent as 
much as possible in text strings, on screen or on paper without resorting to 
graphics files. The Wittgenstein Archives has therefore decided to use a graphics 
code which may be attached to a graphics file, or to a feature which, whilst 
representable by typographical means, nonetheless has graphical characteristics. 
The use of further keywords enables combined text and graphics searches to be 
undertaken which maintains the complete integration of the two elements, 
apparent in the Nachlaß itself. 
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